Historical Summary

NOT by parliamentary resolutions are the great questions of the day settled, but by blood-and-iron."

This was the basic philosophy of Otto von Bismarck, Prime Minister of Prussia from 1862 to 1871 and then German Chancellor from 1871 to 1890. Aristocratic, conservative, militaristic, the Junker Bismarck had no use for "phrase-making and constitutions." His course was clear: it was necessary that Germany be unified under the leadership of Prussia, that Austria be excluded from German affairs, and that obstructions placed in his way by any foreign power be eliminated.

With extraordinary diplomatic cunning, with cynical devotion to the sword, and with little regard for human life, Bismarck proceeded to translate his political theories into action. As a preliminary step toward unification, he utilized a quarrel with little Denmark to test the powerful Prussian army. In 1864 Denmark was defeated quickly. Then, with characteristic shrewdness, Bismarck isolated Austria from foreign help and secured the assistance of Italy by promising Venetia as a reward. In 1866 the Austro-Prussian War lasted just seven weeks.

Only France now stood in the way of German unity. Anxious to preserve the Napoleonic legend of military invincibility, the French emperor tried to hinder the development of German unification. The confused diplomatic meddling of Louis Napoleon, an imperfect carbon-copy version of a more bloodthirsty uncle, gave Bismarck the chance to strike a final blow for German unity.

It was an uneven match—the Prussian bulldog against the French poodle. Bismarck isolated Napoleon, making certain that Italy, Russia, Austria, and England would not come to the aid of France. With the Prussian army in a high state of efficiency under General von Moltke, Bismarck awaited his opportunity. The idea was to needle the Frenchman into declaring war on Prussia, a war which Bismarck very zealously desired.

The conflict came to a head over the projected Hohenzollern candidacy for the throne of Spain. When King William of Prussia was taking the cure at Bad Eros in the middle of July 1870, he was approached by Benedetti, the French ambassador, and was requested to abandon, once and for all time, any claims to the throne of Spain. The surprised monarch telegraphed an account of the meeting to Bismarck in Berlin, who received it while at dinner with Generals von Moltke and von Roon. The hard-bitten militarists had no appetite, since it appeared that war with France was not probable.

With Mephistophelean glee Bismarck edited the dispatch and released it the next day, July 14, 1870, which happened to be Bastille Day. In abbreviated form, the telegram gave the impression of an ultimatum. Both the French and German people interpreted it as an unmitigated insult. France declared war immediately and within two months received a sound beating.

Bismarck was inordinately proud of his handiwork. The following description is his own version of the editing of the Ems Dispatch as given in his Reflections and Reminiscences (1889).

In conversation with a noted German university professor during the time of the Weimar Republic, an American exchange student stated that, in his estimation, Bismarck’s editing of the Eros Dispatch was pretty unscrupulous.

The professor countered: "You Americans are very naive. Certainly not—there was nothing unscrupulous about what Bismarck did. It was clever and very logical under the circumstances. He merely edited the telegram. He shortened it. He didn’t add or change a single word. Besides, he had to use any weapon to fight Louis Napoleon, who sought to prevent our unification."

Key Quote

Moltke: "If I may live to lead our armies in such a war, then the devil may come directly afterwards and fetch away the old carcass!"