Thoughts on Genius.

1. I have for many years desired to see something, long or short, accurately written on the term "genius." It is a word almost in every one’s mouth, and one that is used by abundance of writers; yet, I doubt, it is not well understood by one in a hundred of them that use it. I rejoiced, therefore, to hear that so eminent a writer as Dr. Gerard had published an Essay on the subject. But when I read it, I was disappointed of my hope: It did not in any degree answer my expectations. The ingenious and very learned author did not seem to understand the term at all: Nor could I find one proper definition of it throughout the whole treatise.

2. I hoped, however, to find full satisfaction on the head in Mr. Duff’s "Essay on Original Genius;" although I was surprised to observe it had been published above twenty years before the other. But I was disappointed again. Indeed, it undoubtedly contains many judicious remarks. But even here, what should have been done in the very beginning is not done at all. I want to know, first of all, What do you mean by "genius?" Give me a definition of it. Pray tell me this, before you say anything more about it. This is common sense. Without this, you may ramble as long as you please; and leave me just as wise as I was.

8. The word "genius" was used by the ancient Romans for a superior being, good or bad, who, they supposed, attended every one from his birth to his death. But in this sense of the word it has nothing to do with the present question; wherein it means either a quality of the human mind, or a man endued with that quality. Thus are say indifferently, He is a genius, or has a genius. I would here take it in the latter sense, for the quality which denominates a man a genius.

4. It is evident that genius, taken in this sense, is not invention; although that may possibly bear some relation to it. It is not imagination; although this may be allowed to be one ingredient of it. Much less is it an association of ideas: All these are essentially different from it. So is sensation, on the one hand; and so are memory and judgment, on the other: Unless by judgment we mean (as many do) strength of understanding. It seems to be an extra. Ordinary capacity of mind; sometimes termed extraordinary talents. This may be more or less extensive; there may be a kind of general genius, or an extraordinary capacity for many things; or a particular genius, an extraordinary capacity for one particular thing; it may be, for one particular science, or one particular art. Thus Homer and Milton had a genius, an extraordinary capacity, for poetry. Thus Euclid and Archimedes had a genius, an extraordinary capacity, for geometry. So Cicero had a genius for oratory, and Sir Isaac Newton for natural philosophy. Thus Raphael and Michael Angelo had a genius, an extraordinary capacity, for painting. And so Purcell and Handel (to mention no more) had a genius, an extraordinary capacity, for music. Whereas, Aristotle, Lord Bacon, and a very few beside, seem to have had an universal genius, an extraordinary capacity to excel in whatever they took in hand.

5. It may be allowed that the word is frequently taken in a lower sense. But it has then a word prefixed to it, to restrain its signification. So we say, A man has a middling genius, or a little genius. But it is generally taken for an extraordinary capacity, of whatever kind.

6. Genius in philosophy, poetry, and oratory seems to imply a strong and clear understanding, connected with an unusually extensive and lively imagination. In which respect it may truly be said, not only of a poet, but also of an orator and philosopher, Nascitur, non fit: "He has this endowment by nature, not by art." Yet it may be granted, that art may exceedingly improve what originally sprung from nature. It may receive assistance, likewise, from the memory; (nearly related to the imagination;) and also from the passions, which on various occasions enliven and strengthen the imagination.

7. It may be observed, I purpose to abstain from using the word reason or judgment; because the word understanding is less equivocal; and I would always use one and the same word to express one and the same idea.

8. Both the writers above mentioned suppose taste also to be essential to genius. And, indeed, it does seem to be, if not an essential part, yet an essential property of it. Taste is here a figurative word, borrowed from the sense of tasting, whereby we are enabled first to judge of, and then to relish, our food. So the intellectual taste has a twofold office: It judges, and it relishes. In the former respect, it belongs to the understanding; in the latter, to the imagination.

9. To sum up all: Perhaps genius may be defined, an extraordinary capacity for philosophy, oratory, poetry, or any other art or science; the constituent parts whereof are a strong understanding, and a lively imagination; and the essential property, a just taste.

Lambeth, November 8, 1787. John Wesley.