Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946)

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Author: Justice Murphy

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Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946)

MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, concurring.

The Court’s opinion, in which I join, makes clear that the military trials in these cases were unjustified by the martial law provisions of the Hawaiian Organic Act. Equally obvious, as I see it, is the fact that these trials were forbidden by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States, which applies in both spirit and letter to Hawaii. Indeed, the unconstitutionality of the usurpation of civil power by the military is so great in this instance as to warrant this Court’s complete and outright repudiation of the action.

Abhorrence of military rule is ingrained in our form of government. Those who founded this nation knew full well that the arbitrary power of conviction and punishment for pretended offenses is the hallmark of despotism. See The Federalist, No. 83. History had demonstrated that fact to them time and again. They shed their blood to win independence from a ruler who they alleged was attempting to render the "military independent of and superior to the civil power" and who was "depriving us of the benefits of trial by jury." In the earliest state constitutions, they inserted definite provisions placing the military under "strict subordination" to the civil power at all times and in all cases. And, in framing the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution, they were careful to make sure that the power to punish would rest primarily with the civil authorities at all times. They believed that a trial by an established court, with an impartial jury, was the only certain way to protect an individual against oppression. The Bill of Rights translated that belief into reality by guaranteeing the observance of jury trials and other basic procedural rights foreign to military proceedings. This supremacy of the civil over the military is one of our great heritages. It has made possible the attainment of a high degree of liberty regulated by law, rather than by caprice. Our duty is to give effect to that heritage at all times, that it may be handed down untarnished to future generations.

Such considerations led this Court, in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, to lay down the rule that the military lacks any constitutional power in war or in peace to substitute its tribunals for civil courts that are open and operating in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. Only when a foreign invasion or civil war actually closes the courts and renders it impossible for them to administer criminal justice can martial law validly be invoked to suspend their functions. Even the suspension of power under those conditions is of a most temporary character.

As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration, for, if this government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of power.

Id.,127.

Tested by the Milligan rule, the military proceedings in issue plainly lacked constitutional sanction. Petitioner White was arrested for embezzlement on August 20, 1942, by the provost marshal. Two days later, he was orally informed of the charges against him. Various motions, including a request for a jury trial and for time to prepare a defense, were overruled. On August 25 he was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. Petitioner Duncan was accorded similar streamlined treatment by the military. On February 20, 1944, he engaged in a fight with two armed sentries at the Navy Yard at Honolulu. He was promptly tried without a jury in the provost court on March 2 and sentenced to six months at hard labor, despite his plea of self-defense. Both the petitioners were civilians entitled to the full protection of the Bill of Rights, including the right to jury trial.

It is undenied that the territorial courts of Hawaii were open and functioning during the period when the foregoing events took place. Martial law was proclaimed on December 7, 1941, immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor; provost courts and military commissions were immediately established for the trial of civilians accused of crime. General Orders No. 4. On the next day, December 8, the territorial courts were closed by military order. Thereafter, criminal cases of all description, whether involving offenses against federal or territorial law or violations of military orders, were handled in the provost courts and military commissions. Eight days later, however, the military permitted the reopening of the courts for the trial of limited classes of cases not requiring juries or the subpoenaing of witnesses. General Orders No. 29. On January 27, 1942, further power was restored to the courts by designating them "as agents of the Military Governor" to dispose of civil cases except those involving jury trials, habeas corpus, and other specified matters, and to exercise criminal jurisdiction in limited types of already pending cases. General Orders No. 57. Protests led to the issuance of General Orders No. 133 on August 31, 1942, expanding the jurisdiction of civil courts to cover certain types of jury trials. But General Orders No. 135, issued on September 4, 1942, continued military jurisdiction over offenses directed against the Government or related to the war effort. Proclamations on February 8, 1943, provided that the jurisdiction of the courts was to be reestablished in full except in cases of criminal and civil suits against persons in the armed forces and except for "criminal prosecutions for violations of military orders." These proclamations became effective on March 10, together with a revised code of military orders. Martial law was finally lifted from Hawaii on October 24, 1944.

There can be no question but that, when petitioners White and Duncan were subjected to military trials on August 25, 1942, and March 2, 1944, respectively, the territorial courts of Hawaii were perfectly capable of exercising their normal criminal jurisdiction had the military allowed them to do so. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Hawaii stated that, after the month of April, 1942, he knew of "no sound reason for denial of trial by jury to civilians charged with criminal offense under the laws of the Territory." The Governor of the Territory also testified that the trial of civilians before military courts for offenses against the laws of the Territory was unnecessary and unjustified by the conditions in the Territory when petitioner White was charged with embezzlement in August, 1942. In short, the Bill of Rights disappeared by military fiat, rather than by military necessity.

Moreover, there is no question here as to the loyalty of the Hawaiian judiciary or as to the desire and ability of the judges to cooperate fully with military requirements. There is no evidence of disorder in the community which might have prevented the courts from conducting jury trials. As was said in the Milligan case, p. 127,

It is difficult to see how the safety of the country required martial law in Indiana [Hawaii]. If any of her citizens were plotting treason, the power of arrest could secure them until the government was prepared for their trial when the courts were open and ready to try them. It was as easy to protect witnesses before a civil as a military tribunal, and, as there could be no wish to convict except on sufficient legal evidence, surely an ordained and established court was better able to judge of this than a military tribunal composed of gentlemen not trained to the profession of the law.

Thus, since the courts were open and able to function, the military trials of the petitioners were in violation of the Constitution. Whether, if the courts had been closed by necessity, the military could have tried the petitioners or merely could have held them until the courts reopened is a constitutional issue absent from these cases.

The so-called "open court" rule of the Milligan case, to be sure, has been the subject of severe criticism, especially by military commentators. That criticism is repeated by the Government in these cases. It is said that the fact that courts are open is but one of many factors relevant to determining the necessity, and hence the constitutionality, of military trials of civilians. The argument is made that however adequate the "open court" rule may have been in 1628 or 1864, it is distinctly unsuited to modern warfare conditions where all of the territories of a warring nation may be in combat zones or imminently threatened with long-range attack even while civil courts are operating. Hence, if a military commander, on the basis of his conception of military necessity, requires all civilians accused of crime to be tried summarily before martial law tribunals, the Bill of Rights must bow humbly to his judgment despite the unquestioned ability of the civil courts to exercise their criminal jurisdiction.

The argument thus advanced is as untenable today as it was when cast in the language of the Plantagenets, the Tudors, and the Stuarts. It is a rank appeal to abandon the fate of all our liberties to the reasonableness of the judgment of those who are trained primarily for war. It seeks to justify military usurpation of civilian authority to punish crime without regard to the potency of the Bill of Rights. It deserves repudiation.

The untenable basis of this proposed reversion back to unlimited military rule is revealed by the reasons advanced in support of the reasonableness of the military judgment that it was necessary, even though the civil courts were open and fully able to perform their functions, to impose military trials on all persons accused of crime in Hawaii at the time when the petitioners were tried and convicted:

First. According to the testimony of Admiral Nimitz and General Richardson, Hawaii was in the actual theater of war from December 7, 1941, through the period in question. They stated that there was at all times a danger of invasion, at least in the nature of commando raids or submarine attacks, and that public safety required the imposition of martial law. For present purposes, it is unnecessary to dispute any of such testimony. We may assume that the threat to Hawaii was a real one; we may also take it for granted that the general declaration of martial law was justified. But it does not follow from these assumptions that the military was free under the Constitution to close the civil courts or to strip them of their criminal jurisdiction, especially after the initial shock of the sudden Japanese attack had been dissipated.

From time immemorial, despots have used real or imagined threats to the public welfare as an excuse for needlessly abrogating human rights. That excuse is no less unworthy of our traditions when used in this day of atomic warfare or at a future time when some other type of warfare may be devised. The right to jury trial and the other constitutional rights of an accused individual are too fundamental to be sacrificed merely through a reasonable fear of military assault. There must be some overpowering factor that makes a recognition of those rights incompatible with the public safety before we should consent to their temporary suspension. If those rights may safely be respected in the face of a threatened invasion, no valid reason exists for disregarding them. In other words, the civil courts must be utterly incapable of trying criminals or of dispensing justice in their usual manner before the Bill of Rights may be temporarily suspended.

Martial law [in relation to closing the courts] cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.

Ex parte Milligan, supra,127.

Second. Delays in the civil courts and slowness in their procedure are also cited as an excuse for shearing away their criminal jurisdiction, although lack of knowledge of any undue delays in the Hawaiian courts is admitted. It is said that the military

cannot brook a delay," and that "the punishment must be swift; there is an element of time in it, and we cannot afford to let the trial linger and be protracted.

This military attitude toward constitutional processes is not novel. Civil liberties and military expediency are often irreconcilable. It does take time to secure a grand jury indictment, to allow the accused to procure and confer with counsel, to permit the preparation of a defense, to form a petit jury, to respect the elementary rules of procedure and evidence, and to judge guilt or innocence according to accepted rules of law. But experience has demonstrated that such time is well spent. It is the only method we have of insuring the protection of constitutional rights and of guarding against oppression. The swift trial and punishment which the military desires is precisely what the Bill of Rights outlaws. We would be false to our trust if we allowed the time it takes to give effect to constitutional rights to be used as the very reason for taking away those rights. It is our duty, as well as that of the military, to make sure that such rights are respected whenever possible, even though time may be consumed.

Third. It is further said that the issuance of military orders relating to civilians required that the military have at its disposal some sort of tribunal to enforce those regulations. Any failure to civil courts to convict violators of such regulations would diminish the authority and ability to discharge military responsibilities. This is the ultimate and most vicious of the arguments used to justify military trials. It assumes without proof that civil courts are incompetent, and are prone to free those who are plainly guilty. It assumes further that, because the military may have the valid power to issue regulations, there must be an accompanying power to punish the violations of those regulations; the implicit and final assumption is then made that the military must have power to punish violations of all other statutes and regulations. Nothing is more inconsistent with our form of government, with its distinction between the power to promulgate law and the power to punish violations of the law. Application of this doctrine could soon lead to the complete elimination of civil jurisdiction over crime.

Moreover, the mere fact that it may be more expedient and convenient for the military to try violators of its own orders before its own tribunals does not and should not furnish a constitutional basis for the jurisdiction of such tribunals when civil courts are in fact functioning or are capable of functioning. Constitutional rights are rooted deeper than the wishes and desires of the military.

Fourth. Much is made of the assertion that the civil courts in Hawaii had no jurisdiction over violations of military orders by civilians, and the military courts were therefore necessary. Aside from the fact that the civil courts were ordered not to attempt to exercise such jurisdiction, it is sufficient to note that Congress, on March 21, 1942, vested in the federal courts jurisdiction to enforce military orders with criminal penalties. 56 Stat. 173. It is undisputed that the federal court in Hawaii was open at all times in issue, and was capable of exercising criminal jurisdiction. That the military refrained from using the statutory framework which Congress erected affords no constitutional justification for the creation of military tribunals to try such violators.

Fifth. Objection is made to the enforcement in civil courts of military orders on the ground that it would subject the military to "all sorts of influences, political and otherwise, as happened in the cases on the east coast in both Philadelphia and Boston," and that "it is inconceivable that the military commander should be subjected for the enforcement of his orders to the control of other agents." This is merely a military criticism of the proposition that, in this nation, the military is subordinate to the civil authority. It does not qualify as a recognizable reason for closing the civil courts to criminal cases.

Sixth. Further objection is made that the holding of civil trials might interrupt vital work through the attendance as jurors of war workers. This also is too unmeritorious to warrant serious or lengthy discussion. War workers could easily have been excused from jury duty by military order, if necessary.

Seventh. The final reason advanced relates to the testimony of military leaders that Hawaii is said to have a

heterogeneous population, with all sorts of affinities and loyalties which are alien, in many cases, to the philosophy of life of the American Government,

one-third of the civilian population being of Japanese descent. The Court below observed, 146 F.2d 576, 580, that

Governmental and military problems alike were complicated by the presence in the Territory of tens of thousands of citizens of Japanese ancestry, besides large numbers of aliens of the same race. Obviously the presence of so many inhabitants of doubtful loyalty posed a continuing threat to the public security. Among these people the personnel of clandestine landing parties might mingle freely, without detection. Thus was afforded ideal cover for the activities of the saboteur and the spy. . . . To function in criminal matters, the civilian courts must assemble juries, and citizens of Japanese extraction could not lawfully be excluded from jury panels on the score of race -- even in cases of offenses involving the military security of the Territory. Indeed, the mere assembling of juries and the carrying on of protracted criminal trials might well constitute an invitation to disorder, as well as interference with the vital business of the moment.

The Government adds that many of the military personnel stationed in Hawaii were unaccustomed to living in such a community, and that "potential problems" created in Hawaii by racially mixed juries in criminal cases have heretofore been recognized, "although, on the whole, it has been found that members of such mixed juries have not acted on a racial basis."

The implication apparently is that persons of Japanese descent, including those of American background and training, are of such doubtful loyalty as a group as to constitute a menace justifying the denial of the procedural rights of all accused persons in Hawaii. It is also implied that persons of Japanese descent are unfit for jury duty in Hawaii, and that the problems arising when they serve on juries are so great as to warrant dispensing with the entire jury system in Hawaii if the military so desires. The lack of any factual or logical basis for such implications is clear. It is a known fact that there have been no recorded acts of sabotage, espionage, or fifth column activities by persons of Japanese descent in Hawaii either on or subsequent to December 7, 1941. There was thus no security reason for excluding them from juries, even making the false assumption that it was impossible to separate the loyal from the disloyal. And if there were problems arising from the use of racially mixed juries, elimination of all jury trials was hardly a reasonable or sensible answer to those problems. Especially deplorable, however, is this use of the iniquitous doctrine of racism to justify the imposition of military trials. Racism has no place whatever in our civilization. The Constitution as well as the conscience of mankind disclaims its use for any purpose, military or otherwise. It can only result, as it does in this instance, in striking down individual rights and in aggravating, rather than solving the problems toward which it is directed. It renders impotent the ideal of the dignity of the human personality, destroying something of what is noble in our way of life. We must therefore reject it completely whenever it arises in the course of a legal proceeding.

The reasons here advanced for abandoning the "open court" rule of the Milligan case are without substance. To retreat from that rule is to open the door to rampant militarism and the glorification of war, which have destroyed so many nations in history. There is a very necessary part in our national life for the military; it has defended this country well in its darkest hours of trial. But militarism is not our way of life. It is to be used only in the most extreme circumstances. Moreover, we must be on constant guard against an excessive use of any power, military or otherwise, that results in the needless destruction of our rights and liberties. There must be a careful balancing of interests. And we must ever keep in mind that

[t]he Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all times, and under all circumstances.

Ex parte Milligan, supra,120-121.

1. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, who assumed naval command in the Territory of Hawaii December 18, 1941, testified that the Hawaiian area constituted the only base for the Navy in the Pacific ocean at that time, and that, throughout the war until the last Japanese carrier was destroyed, a Japanese surprise carrier attack on the Islands was within the enemy’s capabilities. While invasion by seaborne troops in sufficient number to seize a beach head was not probable, invasion by submarine commando raiders and espionage parties was imminent and constantly impending. Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., Commanding General of the Central Pacific Area, who assumed command of the Hawaiian Department on June 1, 1943, testified that the Islands were within the theater of operations of the Pacific ocean area, and that the Islands were the keystone of the defense of the western coast of our country. He testified that the Japanese fleet, in April, 1944, was still capable of making a surprise attack upon Oahu by the use of air or undersea craft, and that Pearl Harbor was the most attractive target for the enemy, because it was the base of the Pacific fleet. He said that it was likely that Japan would take the risk of launching an attack because of the attractiveness of the target and the considerable damage that might be inflicted. He pointed out that the probability of night attacks through the use of submarines and parties sent ashore to attack important installations was increased by the presence of disloyal individuals among the population of the Islands. The successes of our fleet had not removed the imminent danger of invasion, because these successes made it more imperative for the enemy to repeat its former invasion of the Islands. He further testified that the discharge of his responsibility for military security required a method of enforcement of military security regulations which was prompt and subject to his immediate control and authority, and that, under martial law, the provost courts provided such a method of enforcement. He testified that a military trial for such an offense as that of Duncan in attacking the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard sentries was necessary in order to uphold the authority of military sentries charged with important military duties. He also gave as his opinion that military necessity required trial of White’s offense in a military tribunal in August of 1942, at which time the Japanese successful military offensive still continued. In addition to the occupation of Hong Kong, the Malay Peninsula, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and bases in New Guinea, the Japanese had successfully occupied our own territories of Guam and Wake, which, with Midway, constituted the Island chain connecting Hawaii with the Philippines, which themselves were soon occupied. The enemy’s occupation of the Solomon Islands, including Tulagi and Guadalcanal, gave the enemy advance air and naval bases for offensive operations against our South Pacific supply line and the north coast of Australia. Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War (1943) 14 (House Doc. 288, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.); McInnis, The War, Third Year (1942) 238.

Early in May, 1942, one Japanese attempt to extend enemy control southeastward along the borders of the Coral Sea, with the ultimate objective of an attack on Australia, was repulsed in the Battle of the Coral Sea. The Japanese offensive, however, continued. In early June, the Japanese attempt to occupy Midway Island preliminary to an invasion of Hawaii was thwarted in the Battle of Midway. At the same time, however, Japanese forces occupied our territory of Attu, Agattu, and Kiska in the Aleutian Islands. Biennial Report, supra, p. 30. (These islands were not recovered until May, 1943. Biennial Report, supra, p. 31). Japanese advances in New Guinea continued during the summer of 1942, and by September, 1942, had forced Allied ground forces back to within 30 miles of Port Moresby, a gateway to Australia. Biennial Report, supra, p. 14. On August 7, a landing was made on Guadalcanal by United States forces. For a time, it did not appear that the effort to wrest this crucial island from the Japanese could succeed. A strong Japanese attempt to recapture Guadalcanal was beaten off as late as November 16, 1942. Not until early in 1943 was enemy resistance on Guadalcanal overcome. Ibid. Even then, our forces had only succeeded in checking the enemy’s offensive, and had not launched their own offensives or ousted the enemy from any American territory. The American offensive in the Central Pacific did not begin until a year later with the invasion of the Gilbert Islands in November, 1943, followed by invasion of the Marshall Islands in January, 1944, and the invasion of the Mariana Islands in July, 1944. Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War (1945) 69. Our forces landed on Guam on July 21, and resistance ceased on August 10. By that time, our forces in the Southwest Pacific under General MacArthur had reduced or bypassed the enemy’s footholds in New Guinea, and the way was prepared for the Battle of the Philippines, which began with the landing on Leyte on October 20, 1944. Id., p. 75 et seq. The "Battle of the Bulge," in the Ardennes, was fought and won at high cost in December and January, 1944-45. Id., p. 44.

2.

Hawaii constitutes the main Pacific outpost of the United States, and accordingly must be regarded as a fortress to whose defense the entire population of the Islands is committed. Its manpower and its economic resources must be subject to a single ultimate control.

General Orders No. 133, by order of the Military Governor of the Territory of Hawaii, August 31, 1942.

3.

Again, in the place where actual military operations are being conducted, the ordinary rights of citizens must yield to paramount military necessity. This was conceded in Milligan’s Case [4 Wall. 2, 127], where it was said in the prevailing opinion:

If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the theater of actual military operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society, and, as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course.

Address by Hon. Charles E. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution (1917) XLII Reports of American Bar Association 232, 244.

In the present cases, the records have incorporated the following testimony of Lt.Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., U.S.A. Commanding General of the Central Pacific Area:

A. . . . this whole area under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Area, Admiral Nimitz, is an active theater of war, and within that theater of war is the theater of operations, of which the Hawaiian Department is a part.

Q. Will you explain what you mean, from the military viewpoint, by the terms "active theater of war" and "theater of operations?"

A. Well, an active theater of war is that area which is or may become actively involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of operations is that part of an active war theater which is needed for the operations either offensively or defensively, according to the missions assigned or a combination of the missions, and it includes also the administrative agencies which are necessary for the conduct of those operations.

* * * *

Q. Is there any military parlance that indicates that portion of the earth’s surface where the fighting actually takes place?

A. Yes.

Q. What is that called?

A. Combat zone.

Q. You would not call Hawaii a combat zone?

A. Yes, I would, because the theater of operations or the combat zone also includes that part assigned to your mission, whether it be offensive or defensive. We are on the defensive mission here in Oahu, whereas the fleet operates offensively from here, and some of our troops which are based here operate offensively from this base. But concurrently with its mission as an offensive base, we have a very decided mission here as a defensive base, and that defensive mission designates or characterizes it as a part of the combat zone.

Q. Then a combat zone can be an area where no shooting is going on at all?

A. Oh, yes; oh, yes.

Q. No real destruction of life or property.

A. Absolutely. . . .

Q. Well, do you have any term, military term, that precisely fits the place where life and property is actually being destroyed as a result of organized warfare

A. Yes, the battle.

4.

To the People of Hawaii:

The military and naval forces of the Empire of Japan have attacked and attempted to invade these islands.

Pursuant to section 67 of the Organic Act of the Territory of Hawaii, approved April 30, 1900, the Governor of Hawaii has called upon me, as commander of the military forces of the United States in Hawaii, to prevent such invasion; has suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; has placed the Territory under martial law; has authorized and requested me and my subordinates to exercise the powers normally exercised by the governor and by subordinate civil officers, and has required all persons within the Territory to obey such proclamations, orders, and regulations as I may issue during the present emergency.

I announce to the people of Hawaii, that, in compliance with the above requests of the Governor of Hawaii, I have this day assumed the position of military governor of Hawaii, and have taken charge of the government of the Territory, of the preservation of order therein, and of putting these islands in a proper state of defense.

All persons within the Territory of Hawaii, whether residents thereof or not whether citizens of the United States or not, of no matter what race or nationality, are warned that, by reason of their presence here, they owe during their stay at least a temporary duty of obedience to the United States, and that they are bound to refrain from giving, by word or deed, any aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States. Any violation of this duty is treason, and will be punished by the severest penalties.

The troops under my command, in putting down any disorder or rebellion and in preventing any aid to the invader, will act with such firmness and vigor and will use such arms as the accomplishment of their tasks may require.

The imminence of attack by the enemy and the possibility of invasion make necessary a stricter control of your actions than would be necessary or proper at other times. I shall therefore shortly publish ordinances governing the conduct of the people of the Territory with respect to the showing of lights, circulation, meetings, censorship, possession of arms, ammunition, and explosives, the sale of intoxicating liquors, and other subjects.

In order to assist in repelling the threatened invasion of our island home, good citizens will cheerfully obey this proclamation and the ordinances to be published; others will be required to do so. Offenders will be severely punished by military tribunals or will be held in custody until such time as the civil courts are able to function.

Pending further instructions from this headquarters, the Hawaii Defense Act and the Proclamations of the Governor of Hawaii heretofore issued thereunder shall continue in full force and effect.

(Italics supplied.)

5. See also the letters of General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of September 25 and 27, 1944, to Governor Thomas E. Dewey, emphasizing the tragic military consequences which at that date would follow disclosure that the United States had "broken" the Japanese secret message code. Hearings before Joint Committee of Congress to Investigate the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., Part III, 1128-1133.

6. Dec. 7, 1941. Governor Poindexter invoked Section 67 of the Hawaiian Organic Act and by proclamation placed the Territory under martial law; suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and delegated to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department of the United States Army not only all of his powers as Governor, but also all of the "powers normally exercised by judicial officers . . . of this territory . . . during the present emergency and until the danger of invasion is removed."

Dec. 7, 1941. By radio, the Governor of Hawaii notified the President of the United States that he had placed the Territory under martial law and suspended the writ of habeas corpus.

Dec. 7, 1941. The Commanding General, Walter C. Short, referring specifically to Governor Poindexter’s proclamation of the same date, himself issued a proclamation notifying the people of Hawaii that he had assumed the position of "Military Governor of Hawaii" and had taken over the government of Hawaii.

Dec. 7, 1941. The Military Governor of Hawaii issued General Orders No. 4 by which he set up a system of military courts to try civilians for violations of the laws of the United States, the laws of the Territory, and "rules, regulations, orders, or policies" of the military authorities. The procedure prescribed for these military courts was that of special and summary courts martial.

Dec. 8, 1941. The courts of the Territory were closed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Hawaii under the direction of the Commanding General.

Dec. 9, 1941. The President approved by radio the action of the Governor suspending the writ and placing the Territory under martial law in accordance with the Organic Act of Hawaii.

Dec. 16, 1941. By General Orders No. 29 the complete closing of the courts was partly relaxed. The relaxation affected only matters not involving jury trials.

Dec. 17, 1941. General Short transferred to General Emmons his powers as Military Governor of Hawaii.

Jan. 27, 1942. The Military Governor, by General Orders No. 57, modified further the restrictions on court proceedings. By this order, the courts of the Territory were authorized to exercise certain of the powers normally exercised by them during the existence of civil government. With certain exceptions, the courts were restored to their respective functions prior to martial law, "as agents of the Military Governor." The criminal courts could not, under the order, summon a grand jury, and neither the criminal nor civil courts could grant a jury trial, or at any time grant a writ of habeas corpus.

Aug. 31, 1942. General Orders No. 133 extended the jurisdiction of the courts to jury trials. This order stated in Sec. I:

. . . Martial law has been declared, and the emergency which called it forth still prevails. . . . It is to be understood that the relaxation herein specified is intended to return to the courts criminal prosecutions and civil litigation to the extent that war conditions permit. However, this action is experimental in nature, and the Military Governor reserves the right further to limit the jurisdiction of the courts or to close them entirely if that course shall be necessary.

Sept. 4, 1942. General Orders No. 135 enumerated the criminal offenses involving crimes against the Government or related to the war effort in respect to which the courts were not authorized to exercise jurisdiction.

Feb. 8, 1943. Governor Stainback, who succeeded Governor Poindexter, issued a public proclamation providing that, although martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus were to remain in effect, the Governor and other civil agencies would resume their respective jurisdictions, including criminal and civil proceedings, except for criminal proceedings against members of the armed forces and civil suits against them for acts or omissions in the line of duty and criminal prosecutions for violations of military orders, except as these exceptions might be waived by the Commanding General in any particular case or class of cases.

Feb. 8, 1943. General Emmons, the Military Governor, issued a public proclamation relinquishing to the Governor and other civilian officers of the Territory the functions set forth in the Governor’s proclamation.

Mar. 10, 1943. General Emmons issued a revised set of General Orders Nos. 1 to 14, and rescinded General Orders Nos. 1 to 181, issued under prior proclamations. General Orders No. 2 vested provost courts and military commissions with jurisdiction to try any case involving violations by a civilian of

rules, regulations, proclamations, or Orders of the Military or Naval authorities, or of the Military Governor of the Territory of Hawaii, or of the laws of war,

and to impose a fine, imprisonment or both. Maximum punishment was to be confinement at hard labor for five years, or a fine of five thousand dollars or both.

Oct.19, 1944. The President issued Proclamation No. 2627 providing that, effective Oct. 24, 1944, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was restored and martial law terminated, and directing the Governor to issue a proclamation accordingly.

Oct. 24, 1944. The Governor issued a proclamation which proclaimed that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is restored, and that martial law is terminated in the Territory of Hawaii."

7. See Footnotes 2 and 6.

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Chicago: Murphy, "Murphy, J., Concurring," Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) in 327 U.S. 304 327 U.S. 325–327 U.S. 335. Original Sources, accessed January 26, 2023, http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=8FXQ43WZDTIWHMF.

MLA: Murphy. "Murphy, J., Concurring." Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946), in 327 U.S. 304, pp. 327 U.S. 325–327 U.S. 335. Original Sources. 26 Jan. 2023. http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=8FXQ43WZDTIWHMF.

Harvard: Murphy, 'Murphy, J., Concurring' in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). cited in 1946, 327 U.S. 304, pp.327 U.S. 325–327 U.S. 335. Original Sources, retrieved 26 January 2023, from http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=8FXQ43WZDTIWHMF.