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Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics
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Historical SummaryOne of the greatest generals of all time, and a military radical, wrote this protest and call for reform. "War," he wrote, "is a science covered with shadows in whose obscurity one cannot move with an assured step. Routine and prejudice, the natural result of ignorance, are its foundation and support." And then he proceeds to indicate the reforms in organization, discipline and strategy required to build effective armies. His work had much to do with the advances in military art made by Napoleon. De Saxe is one of the great links in military development between Vegetius and Napoleon. Many of his propositions now are military commonplaces, but when written they were considered absurd. He understood the human heart, interested himself in his soldiers and, unique in his time, did not treat them like cannon-fodder. The modern soldier still can learn from him and no one can understand the evolution of armies who has not read the famous REVERIES.
CAVALRY ARMOR.
I do not know why armor has been laid aside, for nothing is either so useful or ornamental. 227 It may be said that the invention of gun powder abolished it. It is not that; for, in the time of Henry IV and since to the year 1667, it has been worn. Powder was introduced long before. But you will see the precious cause of its abandonment.
It is certain that a naked squadron, such as ours, will stand a poor chance opposed to one armed from head to foot (assuming the numbers are equal), for what can our men do to pierce them? Their only resource is to fire. It is a great advantage to reduce enemy cavalry to the necessity of firing.
This idea merits examination. I have invented a suit of armor, consisting of thin iron plates fixed on a strong buff-skin. This armor is not expensive, and the entire weight is not over thirty-five pounds. I have tried it; it is proof against a sword. I do not allege it to be the same against a bullet, especially one fired point-blank. But it will resist any that have not been well rammed, become loose in the barrel by the movement of the horses, or come from an oblique direction.
But leave fire at that. The fire of the cavalry is not of any importance; I have always heard it said that those who have fired were beaten. If this is true, we should try to get them to fire. The easiest method to do this is to give your cavalry armor such as I propose; that will make them safe from the sword and an enemy will be forced to fire. But what will happen if he fires? As soon as cavalry shall have received the fire, they will throw themselves on the enemy with irresistible elan, since they have nothing more to fear and wish to avenge the dangers 228 they have just escaped. And how can those who are naked, in effect, be able to defend themselves against others who are invulnerable? If they bestir themselves I defy anyone to kill them. If there were only two such regiments in a whole army, and they had routed a few enemy squadrons, fear and terror would spread throughout because everyone would appear to be armored.
I shall be answered: "The enemy will do the same thing." This is a proof that what I propose is good, since the enemy can find no other remedy except to imitate me. But this will not occur in the following campaign. They will allow themselves to be defeated for ten years, and perhaps for a hundred, before making a change. Whether it results from pride, laziness, or stupidity, all nations change their customs reluctantly. Even good institutions are not adopted, or only after infinite time, although often every one is convinced of their utility. In spite of all this, they are abandoned frequently to follow custom and routine. And we are told coldly: "’Tis contrary to custom."
To demonstrate what I have advanced, one need only recall the number of years during which the Gauls were always overcome by the Romans, without ever attempting to change their discipline or manner of fighting. The Turks are now in the same case; it is neither courage, numbers, nor riches which they lack, but discipline, order, and manner of combat.
At the battle of Peterwaradin, they had more than one hundred thousand men; we with only forty thousand, defeated them. At Belgrade, they had more than two 229 hundred thousand men; we had less than thirty thousand, and they were defeated. And this will always be the case as long as they cling to customs that are injurious These examples should persuade us never to be prejudiced in any thing.
Any objections which may be made against this armor on the pretext that a shot through it will be more dangerous are false. A ball will only pierce the metal without carrying the broken pieces along with it. But even so, if the advantages of armor are weighed justly against the inconveniences, it will be found that the balance favors it infinitely. For of what consequence are a few men who die of wounds because of their armor, if battles are won and it makes the enemy inferior? If it be considered how many troopers perish by the sword, and how many are dangerously wounded by random and weak shots, accidents against which armor guarantees protection, one cannot avoid acknowledging the benefits of it.
It is nothing but indolence and relaxation of discipline that caused it to be laid aside. It is wearisome to carry a cuirass and trail a pike half a century to use it a single day. But as soon as discipline is neglected in a nation, as soon as comfort becomes an aim, it needs no inspiration to foretell that its ruin is near.
The Romans conquered all peoples by their discipline. In the measure that it became corrupted their success decreased. When the emperor Gratian permitted the legions to quit their cuirasses and helmets, because the soldiers complained that they were too heavy, all was 230 lost. The barbarians whom they had defeated during so many centuries vanquished them in turn.
Contents:
Chicago: Maurice de Saxe, "My Reveries Upon the Art of War: Cavalry Armor," Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics in Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics, ed. Thomas R. Phillips (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1940), Original Sources, accessed December 11, 2024, http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=96IB6HU5TUYUD7N.
MLA: de Saxe, Maurice. "My Reveries Upon the Art of War: Cavalry Armor." Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics, in Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics, edited by Thomas R. Phillips, Harrisburg, PA, The Military Service Publishing Company, 1940, Original Sources. 11 Dec. 2024. http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=96IB6HU5TUYUD7N.
Harvard: de Saxe, M, 'My Reveries Upon the Art of War: Cavalry Armor' in Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics. cited in 1940, Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics, ed. , The Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg, PA. Original Sources, retrieved 11 December 2024, from http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=96IB6HU5TUYUD7N.
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