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Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
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General SummaryThis case is from a collection containing the full text of over 16,000 Supreme Court cases from 1793 to the present. The body of Supreme Court decisions are, effectively, the final interpretation of the Constitution. Only an amendment to the Constitution can permanently overturn an interpretation and this has happened only four times in American history.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
Our precedent and our Nation’s historical practices support the Court’s holding today. The Brady Act violates the Tenth Amendment to the extent it forces States and local law enforcement officers to perform background checks on prospective handgun owners and to accept Brady Forms from firearms dealers. See ante at 922. Our holding, of course, does not spell the end of the objectives of the Brady Act. States and chief law enforcement officers may voluntarily continue to participate in the federal program. Moreover, the directives to the States are merely interim provisions scheduled to terminate November 30, 1998. Note following 18 U.S.C. § 922. Congress is also free to amend the interim program to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis with the States if it wishes, as it does with a number of other federal programs. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 402 (conditioning States’ receipt of federal funds for highway safety program on compliance with federal requirements).
In addition, the Court appropriately refrains from deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a) (requiring state and local law enforcement agencies to report cases of missing children to the Department of Justice). The provisions invalidated here, however, which directly compel state officials to administer a federal regulatory program, utterly fail to adhere to the design and structure of our constitutional scheme.
1. Our most recent treatment of the Second Amendment occurred in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), in which we reversed the District Court’s invalidation of the National Firearms Act, enacted in 1934. In Miller, we determined that the Second Amendment did not guarantee a citizen’s right to possess a sawed-off shotgun, because that weapon had not been shown to be "ordinary military equipment" that could "contribute to the common defense." Id. at 178. The Court did not, however, attempt to define, or otherwise construe, the substantive right protected by the Second Amendment.
2. Marshaling an impressive array of historical evidence, a growing body of scholarly commentary indicates that the "right to keep and bear arms" is, as the Amendment’s text suggests, a personal right. See, e.g., J. Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right 162 (1994); S. Halbrook, That Every Man Be Armed, The Evolution of a Constitutional Right (1984); Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 Duke L.J. 1236 (1994); Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 1193 (1992); Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 Geo.L.J. 309 (1991); Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637 (1989); Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich.L.Rev. 204 (1983). Other scholars, however, argue that the Second Amendment does not secure a personal right to keep or to bear arms. See, e.g., Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1365 (1993); Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 551 (1991); Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson’s The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 661 (1989); Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. Am.Hist. 22 (1984). Although somewhat overlooked in our jurisprudence, the Amendment has certainly engendered considerable academic, as well as public, debate.
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Chicago: O'Connor, "O’connor, J., Concurring," Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) in 521 U.S. 898 521 U.S. 936. Original Sources, accessed June 7, 2023, http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=GMPEHP7RXFC1Z88.
MLA: O'Connor. "O’connor, J., Concurring." Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), in 521 U.S. 898, page 521 U.S. 936. Original Sources. 7 Jun. 2023. http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=GMPEHP7RXFC1Z88.
Harvard: O'Connor, 'O’connor, J., Concurring' in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). cited in 1997, 521 U.S. 898, pp.521 U.S. 936. Original Sources, retrieved 7 June 2023, from http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=GMPEHP7RXFC1Z88.
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