Chapter XX: Power as to Army and Navy

§189. The next power of Congress is, "to raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years." The power to raise armies would seem to be an indispensable incident to the power to declare war, if the later is not to be a mere idle sound, or instrument of mischief. Under the Confederation, however, the two powers were separated; Congress was authorized to declare war; but it could not raise troops. It could only make requisitions upon the States to raise them. The experience of the whole country, during the Revolutionary War, established, to the satisfaction of every statesman, the utter inadequacy and impropriety of this system of requisition. It was equally at war with economy, efficiency, and safety. It gave birth to a competition between the States, which created a kind of auction of men. In order to furnish the quotas required of them, they outbid each other, till bounties grew to an enormous and insupportable size. On this account, many persons procrastinated their enlistment, or enlisted only for short periods. Hence, there were but slow and scanty levies of men in the most critical emergencies of our affairs; short enlistments at an unparalleled expense; and continual fluctuations in the troops,ruinous to their discipline, and subjecting the public safety frequently to the perilous crisis of a disbanded army. Hence also arose those oppressive expedients for raising men, which were occasionally practised, and which nothing, but the enthusiasm of liberty, could have induced the people to endure. The burden was also very unequally distributed. The States near the seat of war, influenced by motives of self-preservation, made efforts to furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities, while those at a distance were exceedingly remiss in their exertions. In short, the army was frequently composed of three bodies of men; first raw recruits; secondly, persons, who were just about completing their term of service; and thirdly, of persons, who had served out half their term, and were quietly waiting for its determination. Under such circumstances, the wonder is not, that its military operations were tardy, irregular, and often unsuccessful; but, that it was ever able to make headway at all against an enemy, possessing a fine establishment, well appointed, well armed, well clothed, and well paid. The appointment, too, by the States, of all regimental officers, had a tendency to destroy all harmony and subordination, so necessary to the success of military life. The consequence was (as is well known) general inefficiency, want of economy, mischievous delays, and great inequality of burdens. This is, doubtless, the reason, why the power is expressly given to Congress. It insures promptitude and unity of action, and, at the same time, promotes economy and harmony of operations. Nor is it in war only, that the power to raise armies may be usefully applied. It is important to suppress domestic rebellions and insurrections, and to prevent foreign aggressions and invasions. A nation, which is prepared for war in times of peace, will, thereby, often escape the necessity of engaging in war. Its rights will be respected, and its wrongs redressed. Imbecility and want of preparation invite aggression, and protract controversy.

§190. But, inasmuch as the power to raise armies may be perverted in times of peace to improper purposes, a restriction is imposed upon the grant of appropriations by Congress forthe maintenance of them. So that, at furthest, every two years, the propriety of retaining an existing army must regularly come before the Representatives of the people in Congress for consideration; and if no appropriation is made, the army is necessarily disbanded. Thus, the army may, at any time within two years, be in effect dissolved, by a majority of Congress, without the consent of the President, by a simple refusal to grant supplies. In point of fact, Congress has hitherto made the appropriations annual, as they have a constitutional right to do, if it is deemed expedient. The power, therefore, is surrounded by all reasonable restrictions, as to its exercise; and it has hitherto been used in a manner, which has conferred lasting benefits on the country.

§191. The next power of Congress is, "to provide, and maintain a navy." This power has the same general object, as that to raise armies. But, in its own nature, it is far more safe and, for a maritime nation, quite as indispensable. No nation was ever deprived of its liberty by its navy. The same cannot be said of its army. And a commercial nation would be utterly without its due share of sovereignty upon the ocean, its means of self-protection at home, and its power of efficient action abroad, without the possession of a navy. Yet this power, until a comparatively recent period, found little favor with some of our statesmen of no mean celebrity. It was not until the brilliant achievements of our little navy, during the late war, (1812-1814,) had shed a glory, as well as a protection, over our national flag in every sea, that the country became alive to its vast importance and efficiency. At present, it enjoys an extensive public favor, which, having been earned by the most gallant deeds, can scarcely fail of permanently engrafting it into the solid establishments of our national strength.

§192. The next power of Congress is, "to make rules, for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." Upon the propriety of this power, as an incident to the preceding, it is unnecessary to enlarge. It is equally beyond the reach of cavil and complaint.