Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988)

JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join Part II of JUSTICE MARSHALL’S concurring opinion because I agree that harmless error analysis is inappropriate where the error is a Sixth Amendment violation under Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), which results in the erroneous admission of psychiatric testimony in a capital sentencing proceeding. The situation is particularly acute where, under a system such as that of Texas, the jury must answer the very question that the psychiatrist purports to answer. I am fortified in this conclusion by my continuing concern -- wholly apart from the testimony of the ubiquitous Doctor Grigson in Texas capital cases -- about the reliability of psychiatric testimony as to a defendant’s future dangerousness (wrong two times out of three). See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983) (dissenting opinion).