FOOTNOTES

1 Plato, Rep. 527.2 The prospectus of the System of Synthetic Philosophy is dated 1860. Darwin’s Origin of Species is 1859. But such ideas, both in Mr. Spencer and others, are earlier than Darwin’s book.3 Hegel’s Verhältniss, the supreme category of what is called actuality: where object is necessitated by outside object.4 Cf. Herbart, Werke (ed. Kehrbach), iv. 372. This consciousness proper is what Leibniz called « Apperception, » la connaissance réflexive de l’état intérieur (Nouveaux Essais).5 Herbart, Werke, vi. 55 (ed. Kehrbach).6 p. 59 (§ 440).7 p. 63 (§ 440).8 These remarks refer to four out of the five Herbartian ethical ideas. See also Leibniz, who (in 1693, De Notionibus juris et justitiae) had given the following definitions: “Caritas est benevolentia universalis. Justitia est caritas sapientis. Sapientia est scientia felicitatis.” The jus naturae has three grades: the lowest, jus strictum; the second, aequitas (or caritas, in the narrower sense); and the highest, pietas, which is honeste, i.e. pie vivere.9 To which the Greek πόλις, the Latin civitas or respublica, were only approximations. Hegel is not writing a history. If he were, it would be necessary for him to point out how far the individual instance, e.g. Rome, or Prussia, corresponded to its Idea.     10 Shakespeare’s phrase, as in Othello, iii. 2; Lover’s Complaint,           v. 24.

11 Iliad, xii. 243.

12 See Hegel’s Logic, pp. 257 seq.13 See p. 153 (§ 550).14 Cf. Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel, chaps. xviii, xxvi.15 As stated in p. 167 (Encycl. § 554). Cf. Phenom. d. Geistes, cap. vii, which includes the Religion of Art, and the same point of view is explicit in the first edition of the Encyclopaedia.

16 Philosophie der Religion (Werke, xi. 5).

     17 Hegel, Phenomenologie des Geistes (Werke, ii. 545). The           meeting-ground of the Greek spirit, as it passed through Rome, with           Christianity.18 Ib., p. 584. 19 Phenomenologie des Geistes (Werke, ii. 572). Thus Hegelian idealism claims to be the philosophical counterpart of the central dogma of Christianity.20 From the old Provençal Lay of Boëthius.21 It is the doctrine of the intellectus agens, or in actu; the actus purus of the Schoolmen.

22 Einleitung in die Philosophie, §§ 1, 2.

23 Psychologie als Wissenschaft, Vorrede.

24 Einleitung in die Philosophie, §§ 11, 12.

25 Einleitung in die Philosophie, § 18: cf. Werke, ed. Kehrbach, v.           108.     26 Cf. Plato’s remarks on the problem in the word Self-control.           Republ. 430-1.

27 Lehrbuch der Psychologie, §§ 202, 203.

28 Allgemeine Metaphysik, Vorrede.

29 Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik (1806), § 13.

30 Werke, ed. Kehrbach (Ueber die Möglichkeit, &c), v. 96.

31 Ibid., p. 100.

32 One might almost fancy Herbart was translating into a general philosophic thesis the words in which Goethe has described how he overcame a real trouble by transmuting it into an ideal shape, e.g. Wahrheit und Dichtung, cap. xii.33 Herbart’s language is almost identical with Hegel’s: Encycl. § 389 (p. 12). Cf. Spencer, Psychology, i. 192. “Feelings are in all cases the materials out of which the superior tracts of consciousness and intellect are evolved.”

34 Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel, ch. xvii.

35 Psychologia Empirica, § 29.

36 As is also the case with Herbart’s metaphysical reality of the Soul. 37 Human Nature, vii. 2. “Pleasure, Love, and appetite, which is also called desire, are divers names for divers considerations of the same thing....” Deliberation is (ch. xii. 1) the “alternate succession of appetite and fears.”

38 Eth. ii. 48 Schol.

39 Eth. ii. 43 Schol.: cf. 49 Schol.

40 This wide scope of thinking (cogitatio, penser) is at least as old as the Cartesian school: and should be kept in view, as against a tendency to narrow its range to the mere intellect.     41 e.g. Analysis of the Human Mind, ch. xxiv. “Attention is but           another name for the interesting character of the idea;” ch. xix.           “Desire and the idea of a pleasurable sensation are convertible           terms.”42 As Mr. Spencer says (Psychology, i. 141), “Objective psychology can have no existence as such without borrowing its data from subjective psychology.”43 The same failure to note that experiment is valuable only where general points of view are defined, is a common fault in biology.44 Münsterberg, Aufgaben und Methoden der Psychologie, p. 144.

45 Lehrbuch der Psychologie, § 54 (2nd ed.), or § 11 (1st ed.).

46 See p. 11 (§ 387).47 Cf. Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, i. 43. “There is more reason in thy body than in thy best wisdom.”48 This language is very characteristic of the physicists who dabble in psychology and imagine they are treading in the steps of Kant, if not even verifying what they call his guesswork: cf. Ziehen, Physiol. Psychologie, 2nd ed. p. 212. “In every case there is given us only the psychical series of sensations and their memory-images, and it is only a universal hypothesis if we assume beside this psychical series a material series standing in causal relation to it.... The material series is not given equally originally with the psychical.”49 It is the same radical feature of consciousness which is thus noted by Mr. Spencer, Psychology, i. 475. “Perception and sensation are ever tending to exclude each other but never succeed.” “Cognition and feeling are antithetical and inseparable.” “Consciousness continues only in virtue of this conflict.” Cf. Plato’s resolution in the Philebus of the contest between intelligence and feeling (pleasure).50 It is the quasi-Aristotelian ἀπαγωγή, defined as the step from one proposition to another, the knowledge of which will set the first proposition in a full light.

51 Grundlage des Naturrechts, § 5.

52 System der Sittenlehre, § 8, iv.

     53 Even though religion (according to Kant) conceive them as divine           commands.54 Cf. Hegel’s Werke, vii. 2, p. 236 (Lecture-note on § 410). “We must treat as utterly empty the fancy of those who suppose that properly man should have no organic body,” &c.; and see p. 159 of the present work.

55 Criticism of Pure Reason, Architectonic.

     56 Spencer, Psychology, i. 291: “Mind can be understood only by           observing how mind is evolved.”57 Cf. Spencer, Principles of Ethics, i. 339: “The ethical sentiment proper is, in the great mass of cases, scarcely discernible.”

58 Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel, p. 143.

59 Windelband (W.), Präludien (1884), p. 288.60 Cf. Plato, Republic, p. 486.

61 Human Nature: Morals, Part III.

62 Emotion and Will, ch. xv. § 23.

     63 It is characteristic of the Kantian doctrine to absolutise the           conception of Duty and make it express the essence of the whole           ethical idea.     64 Which are still, as the Socialist Fourier says, states of social           incoherence, specially favourable to falsehood.

65 Rechtsphilosophie, § 4.

66 Cf. Schelling, ii. 12: “There are no born sons of freedom.”67 Simmel (G.), Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft, i. 184.

68 Jenseits von Gut und Böse, p. 225.

69 Aristot. Polit. i. 6.70 Plato, Phaedo.71 Carus, Psyche, p. 1.72 See Arist., Anal. Post. ii. 19 (ed. Berl. 100, a. 10).73 Cf. The Logic of Hegel, notes &c., p. 421.     74 “Omnia individua corpora quamvis diversis gradibus animata sunt.”           Eth. ii. 13. schol.

75 Nanna (1848): Zendavesta (1851): Ueber die Seelenfrage (1861).

76 Described by S. as the rise from mere physical cause to physiological stimulus (Reiz), to psychical motive.77 Infra, p. 12.78 Aristot., De Anima, i. c. 4, 5.

79 Wilhelm Meister’s Wanderjahre, i. 10.

80 Wilhelm Meister’s Wanderjahre, iv. 18.

     81 Works like Preyer’s Seele des Kindes illustrate this aspect of           mental evolution; its acquirement of definite and correlated           functions.82 Cf. the end of Caleb Balderstone (in The Bride of Lammermoor): “With a fidelity sometimes displayed by the canine race, but seldom by human beings, he pined and died.”83 See Windischmann’s letters in Briefe von und an Hegel.84 Cf. Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel, chaps. xii-xiv.85 Kieser’s Tellurismus is, according to Schopenhauer, “the fullest and most thorough text-book of Animal Magnetism.”86 Cf. Fichte, Nachgelassene Werke, iii. 295 (Tagebuch über den animalischen Magnetismus, 1813), and Schopenhauer, Der Wille in der Natur.87 Bernheim: La suggestion domine toute l’histoire de l’humanité.88 An instance from an unexpected quarter, in Eckermann’s conversations with Goethe: “In my young days I have experienced cases enough, where on lonely walks there came over me a powerful yearning for a beloved girl, and I thought of her so long till she actually came to meet me.” (Conversation of Oct. 7, 1827.) 89 Gleichsam in einer Vorwelt, einer diese Welt schaffenden Welt (Nachgelassene Werke, iii. 321). 90 Selbst-bewusstsein is not self-consciousness, in the vulgar sense of brooding over feelings and self: but consciousness which is active and outgoing, rather than receptive and passive. It is practical, as opposed to theoretical.91 The more detailed exposition of this Phenomenology of Mind is given in the book with that title: Hegel’s Werke, ii. pp. 71-316.

92 System der Sittlichkeit, p. 15 (see Essay V).

93 Hegel’s Werke, viii. 313, and cf. the passage quoted in my Logic of Hegel, notes, pp. 384, 385.94 Hegel’s Briefe, i. 15. 95 Kritik der Verfassung Deutschlands, edited by G. Mollat (1893). Parts of this were already given by Haym and Rosenkranz. The same editor has also in this year published, though not quite in full, Hegel’s System der Sittlichkeit, to which reference is made in what follows.     96 In which some may find a prophecy of the effects of “blood and iron”           in 1866. 97 Die Absolute Regierung: in the System der Sittlichkeit, p. 32: cf. p. 55. Hegel himself compares it to Fichte’s Ephorate.

98 Die Absolute Regierung, l.c. pp. 37, 38.

99 Some idea of his meaning may perhaps be gathered by comparison with passages in Wilhelm Meister’s Wanderjahre, ii. 1, 2.

100 Kritik der Verfassung, p. 20.

     101 In some respects Bacon’s attitude in the struggle between royalty           and parliament may be compared.     102 Just as Schopenhauer, on the contrary, always says moralisch—never           sittlich.103 Grey (G.), Journals of two Expeditions of Discovery in North-West and Western Australia, ii. 220.     104 With some variation of ownership, perhaps, according to the           prevalence of so-called matriarchal or patriarchal households.     105 Cf. the custom in certain tribes which names the father after his           child: as if the son first gave his father legitimate position in           society.

106 System der Sittlichkeit, p. 8.

107 Aufhebung (positive) as given in absolute Sittlichkeit.

108 System der Sittlichkeit, p. 15.

     109 This phraseology shows the influence of Schelling, with whom he was           at this epoch associated. See Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel,           ch. xiv.     110 Cf. the intermediate function assigned (see above, p. clxxxiii) to           the priests and the aged.

111 System der Sittlichkeit, p. 19.

112 See infra, p. 156.

113 Wordsworth’s Laodamia.

     114 “For it’s Tommy this, an’ Tommy that, an’ ‘Chuck him out, the           brute!’           But it’s ‘Saviour of ’is country’ when the guns begin to shoot.”115 “I can assure you,” said Werner (the merchant), “that I never reflected on the State in my life. My tolls, charges and dues I have paid for no other reason than that it was established usage.” (Wilh. Meisters Lehrjahre, viii. 2.)

116 System der Sittlichkeit, p. 40.

117 System der Sittlichkeit, p. 65.

118 Ibid. p. 46.

119 Natürliche Seele.

120 Natürliche Qualitäten.

121 Empfindung.

122 Die fühlende Seele.

123 Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns, who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorised their belief in the sublimity of the revelations of somnambulistic vision. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. 71), “The author of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measure of truth, and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dreams). And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination, not to the wisdom, but, to the foolishness of man; for no man when in his wits attains prophetic truth and inspiration; but when he receives the inspired word, either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep, or he is demented by some distemper or possession (enthusiasm).” Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily conditions on which such visionary knowledge depends, and the possibility of the truth of the dreams, but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind.

124 Selbstgefühl.

125 Gewohnheit.

126 Die wirkliche Seele.

127 Das Bewußtsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewußtsein.

128 Wahrnehmung.

129 Der Verstand.

130 Selbstbewußtsein.

131 Die Begierde.

132 Das anerkennende Selbstbewußtsein.

133 Die Vernunft.

134 Der Geist.

135 Die Intelligenz.

136 Anschauung.

137 Vorstellung.

138 Die Erinnerung.

139 Die Einbildungskraft.

140 Phantasie.

141 Gedächtniß.

142 Auswendiges.

143 Inwendiges.

144 Das Denken.

145 Der praktische Geist.

146 Der praktische Gefühl.

147 Der Triebe und die Willkühr.

148 Die Glückseligkeit.

149 Der freie Geist.

150 Gesess.

151 Sitte.

152 Das Recht.

153 Moralität.

154 Naturrecht.

155 Moralität.

156 Der Vorsatz.

157 That.

158 Handlung.

159 Die Absicht und das Wohl.

160 Das Gute und das Böse.

161 Die Sittlichkeit.

162 Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft.

163 Das System der Bedürfnisse.

164 Die Rechtspflege.

165 Geseß.

166 Die Polizei und die Corporation.

167 Inneres Staatsrecht.

168 Das äußere Staatsrecht.

169 Die Weltgeschichte.

170 Weltweisheit.

171 Der absolute Geist.

172 Die geoffenbarte Religion.

     173 [The citation given by Hegel from Schlegel’s translation is here           replaced by the version (in one or two points different) in the           Sacred Books of the East, vol. viii.]174 In order to give a clearer impression of it, I cannot refrain from quoting a few passages, which may at the same time give some indication of the marvellous skill of Rückert, from whom they are taken, as a translator. [For Rückert’s verses a version is here substituted in which I have been kindly helped by Miss May Kendall.]

III.

I saw but One through all heaven’s starry spaces gleaming: I saw but One in all sea billows wildly streaming. I looked into the heart, a waste of worlds, a sea,— I saw a thousand dreams,—yet One amid all dreaming. And earth, air, water, fire, when thy decree is given, Are molten into One: against thee none hath striven. There is no living heart but beats unfailingly In the one song of praise to thee, from earth and heaven.

V.

As one ray of thy light appears the noonday sun, But yet thy light and mine eternally are one. As dust beneath thy feet the heaven that rolls on high: Yet only one, and one for ever, thou and I. The dust may turn to heaven, and heaven to dust decay; Yet art thou one with me, and shalt be one for aye. How may the words of life that fill heaven’s utmost part Rest in the narrow casket of one poor human heart? How can the sun’s own rays, a fairer gleam to fling, Hide in a lowly husk, the jewel’s covering? How may the rose-grove all its glorious bloom unfold, Drinking in mire and slime, and feeding on the mould? How can the darksome shell that sips the salt sea stream Fashion a shining pearl, the sunlight’s joyous beam? Oh, heart! should warm winds fan thee, should’st thou floods endure, One element are wind and flood; but be thou pure.

IX.

I’ll tell thee how from out the dust God moulded man,— Because the breath of Love He breathed into his clay: I’ll tell thee why the spheres their whirling paths began,— They mirror to God’s throne Love’s glory day by day: I’ll tell thee why the morning winds blow o’er the grove,— It is to bid Love’s roses bloom abundantly: I’ll tell thee why the night broods deep the earth above,— Love’s bridal tent to deck with sacred canopy: All riddles of the earth dost thou desire to prove?— To every earthly riddle is Love alone the key.

XV.

Life shrinks from Death in woe and fear, Though Death ends well Life’s bitter need: So shrinks the heart when Love draws near, As though ’twere Death in very deed: For wheresoever Love finds room, There Self, the sullen tyrant, dies. So let him perish in the gloom,— Thou to the dawn of freedom rise.In this poetry, which soars over all that is external and sensuous, who would recognise the prosaic ideas current about so-called pantheism—ideas which let the divine sink to the external and the sensuous? The copious extracts which Tholuck, in his work Anthology from the Eastern Mystics, gives us from the poems of Jelaleddin and others, are made from the very point of view now under discussion. In his Introduction, Herr Tholuck proves how profoundly his soul has caught the note of mysticism; and there, too, he points out the characteristic traits of its oriental phase, in distinction from that of the West and Christendom. With all their divergence, however, they have in common the mystical character. The conjunction of Mysticism with so-called Pantheism, as he says (p. 53), implies that inward quickening of soul and spirit which inevitably tends to annihilate that external Everything, which Pantheism is usually held to adore. But beyond that, Herr Tholuck leaves matters standing at the usual indistinct conception of Pantheism; a profounder discussion of it would have had, for the author’s emotional Christianity, no direct interest; but we see that personally he is carried away by remarkable enthusiasm for a mysticism which, in the ordinary phrase, entirely deserves the epithet Pantheistic. Where, however, he tries philosophising (p. 12), he does not get beyond the standpoint of the “rationalist” metaphysic with its uncritical categories.