The Future Monroe Doctrine (1901)
BY PROFESSOR ALBERT BUSHNELL HART
IS it not possible to rise above temporary and fleeting issues to some understanding as to what the "permanent interest" of the United States demands? To formulate a state paper expressing such a principle is the work of a statesman and not of an essayist; but some clear and definite bases may be laid down for any permanent policy in pan-American affairs.
The first is that the territory of the United States is not to be hemmed in and cut off from its natural outlets: the annexation of Louisiana, of the Floridas, of Oregon, and of California, all resulted from this principle; at present it is not necessary to appeal to it, because our territory is everywhere accessible. The only exception is the highway of the Great Lakes, which has no natural route to the sea; but it is easier to make a safe commercial connection through the Mohawk Valley than through the lower St. Lawrence, and we do not need Quebec while we have New York. The only two strategic points which seemed threatening a few years ago have now come into our possession by the control of Cuba and the annexation of Hawaii. We are well protected.
The next principle is that the commerce of the United States with its American neighbors must not be shackled by any restrictions emanating from Europe. We reserve the right to cut off our own trade, and the failure of several successive series of reciprocity treaties in the last twenty-five years seems to show that Congress does not wish to extend our commerce in America at present; but we do insist that no obstacle shall grow up to at least an equal opportunity in the commerce of the Latin-American states.
In the third place, we must accept the existence of a large territorial part of the British Empire in America, and so far forth must admit that Great Britain is an American power in the same sense that we are an Asiatic power. The annexation of Canada, which has been predicted by many keen-sighted men for a century and a quarter, now seems more distant than ever, because the Canadians are satisfied, and Great Britain desires that they should be satisfied. Next-door intimacy with Canada has always caused, and probably will continue to cause, friction and some heart-burning; the Oregon question, the San Juan question, the Alaskan boundary question, navigation of the St. Lawrence, the northeastern fisheries, the Maine boundary, transit in bond, rivalries of transcontinental railroads, tariff warfare—all these disagreeable disputes might have been avoided if Montgomery and Arnold had taken Quebec in 1775; but they might also have been avoided if Burgoyne had taken Albany three years later. In the balance of national forces it came out that both the United States and Great Britain retained great areas of North American territory. To deny the right of Great Britain to hold Canada and Jamaica is to deny the original Monroe Doctrine, which distinctly disclaims any hostility to those existing colonies.
In the fourth place, we are facing the problem of a canal from ocean to ocean, in which the country most advantaged will be the United States; whatever the likelihood that the transcontinental railroads would still compete against a water transportation through a locked canal, the necessity of piercing the isthmus is too plain to be disregarded. One cannot quarrel with the people of the United States for the intention of constructing such a canal, although it is a fair question for engineers, statesmen, and financiers whether the cheapest and best route is not the completion of the Panama route. But the canal is not simply a road from the Atlantic coast of the United States to the Pacific; it is an international benefit which the United States has no right to take upon itself, except as the representative of civilized commerce. The oceans are the property of mankind, and if we try to shut up an artificial strait between them, we may some day find the Bosphorus closed to us.
The next principle must be that in American affairs, as in all affairs, the United States shall stand by its obligations. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was ratified because it was a fair settlement of a very dangerous question; and we do not realize how many critical questions have been kept in abeyance by that treaty. The British government unnecessarily aroused the hostility of America by the insistence on territorial right through control of a puppet king of the Mosquito Indians; but all other interference in the construction of the canal has been warded off; and now that Great Britain gracefully consents to give up joint guaranty, it leaves a clear field for American ownership.
The next principle is that if the United States is to retain its influence, it must refrain from further annexation of Latin-American territory. The first movement toward the annexation of any part of Nicaragua or of Central America will arouse the hostility of all the other American nations, and undo all the work of commercial conciliation. Neither the Monroe Doctrine nor any other common-sense doctrine delivers our neighbors over to us for spoliation.
These are general principles upon which the "doctrine of permanent interest" must proceed, because they are right, just, and reasonable principles, but also because they lie in the nature of our international conditions. There is no longer the slightest danger of any European intervention in America; the last suggestion of such a thing was Grant’s proposed joint intervention in Cuba in 1875. There is no longer any danger of establishing new European colonies in America; the Venezuelan incident, with all its unreason, revealed clearly to the rest of the world the temper of the United States on that point. There is no longer any danger of the introduction of European monarchies—and, in fact, no European monarch could teach anything about absolute government to a Latin-American dictator.
Finally, neither the American Doctrine nor any form of American doctrine means that the United States is to do whatever may seem good to it in America, or that its "permanent interest" involves a right to get away from inconvenient restrictions in the law of nations, as established by the practice of civilized peoples. We have too much at stake to raise unnecessary difficulties at home or abroad; we have to deal with and consider Latin-Americans, British-Americans, and American-Americans; we have to safeguard our interests in Europe, in the Pacific, and in Asia; we have to take account of the influence which this nation seems destined to exert on mankind. If there is to be in the coming century a great battle of Armageddon—once more Europe against the Huns—we can no more help taking our part with the hosts of freedom than we can help educating our children, building our churches, or maintaining the rights of the individual. There is no proper and permanent doctrine of foreign policy which does not recognize the United States as the great leader in all American affairs, and one of the great leaders in the affairs of mankind. There is no safe or permanent doctrine which does not recognize our sisterhood with other nations under international law. The "doctrine of permanent interest," therefore, is a doctrine of peace in America, international fellowship in the Eastern Hemisphere, and civilization everywhere.
Albert Bushnell Hart, (New York 1901).