Denver Stock Yard v. Livestock Assn., 356 U.S. 282 (1958)

MR. JUSTICE CLARK, concurring.

I agree that invalidity is evident on the face of the regulations issued by the Denver Union Stock Yard Company. Section 304 of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 Stat. 164, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 205, requires a market agency registered at a given stockyard to furnish reasonable services at that stockyard on reasonable request of a customer. Respondent’s complaint alleges that respondent is registered at other stockyards besides the Denver yard, and, because of petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint, we take those allegations as true. Under § 304, the several registrations impose a duty on the part of respondent to offer Colorado customers reasonable service at each yard where it is registered. Since the Denver regulations prohibit respondent’s fulfillment of that statutory duty, they would appear void on their face under §307, which declares unlawful "every unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory regulation or practice." 42 Stat. 165, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 208.

The regulatory scheme devised by the Congress, however, makes it possible for invalidity on the face of the regulations to be overcome by evidence showing that their application and operation is not in fact unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory. Primary jurisdiction is placed in the Secretary to make such a determination. Because of that, I should think the normal course of action where dismissal is found unwarranted would be to remand the case to the Secretary for a full hearing.

That procedure does not appear to be in order here, however, because the purpose and intended effect of the regulations is crystal clear. The president of the Denver stockyard, before the case took its present posture, filed an affidavit in the record alleging in substance that, in the period July 1, 1951, to June 30, 1955, respondent market agency "continually diverted away from the Denver Union Stockyards a large volume of livestock" which normally would have been consigned to that yard, that respondent sold lambs "direct to many packers . . . including some located on the Atlantic Coast and in interior Iowa," and that

many like transactions were conducted by [respondent] in its own name or for its account by its wholly owned subsidiary, the Western Order Buyers, or by the employees of [respondent] or its said subsidiary.

The affidavit further recites that,

As a result, the Denver Union Stock Yard Company in the early part of this year [1955] issued item 10(c) of its rules and regulations which was designed to . . . eliminate an unjust, unreasonable, and discriminatory practice by [respondent]. . . .

The purpose and effect of the regulations is made certain by the additional statement that,

[I]t was felt that market agencies may not engage in transactions away from the Denver market inconsistent with the duties imposed upon them to render the best possible service which, when boiled down, means that they must refrain from diverting the normal flow of livestock to this market if they are to continue to operate at the market.

(Emphasis added.) With greater force than any other possible evidence, this frank statement reveals that petitioner intended to, and did, monopolize the livestock market in the entire State of Colorado, save a small area on the eastern border. Since the Denver stockyard itself would impose the only sanction possible for violation of the regulation, namely, cancellation of registration, the affidavit is a complete answer to any evidence offered as to reasonableness in practical operation. The regulations, according to their author, bluntly say that to continue operation on the Denver market a registrant "must refrain" from selling Colorado livestock, unless from the small area mentioned above, on any other market. It would be a useless formality to remand in the light of such an irrefutable acknowledgment.

It also is worthy of note that petitioner elected to defend the regulations without any evidence when it moved to dismiss the complaint before the Secretary. Petitioner could have offered its presently proffered explanations then, but chose not to do so. While such action does not preclude a remand now for a full hearing, petitioner’s about-face on losing the battle lends no support to its cause.

For these reasons, I join the judgment of affirmance.

1. By § 301(a) of the Packers and Stockyards Act (42 Stat. 159, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 181 et seq.), the term "stockyard owner" is defined to mean "any person engaged in the business of conducting or operating a stockyard."

2. Section 302 of the Act defines a stockyard to be

any place, establishment, or facility commonly known as stockyards, conducted or operated for compensation or profit as a public market, consisting of pens, or other inclosures, and their appurtenances, in which live cattle, sheep, swine, horses, mules, or goats are received, held, or kept for sale or shipment in commerce.

3. Section 301(b) defines the term "stockyard services" to mean

services or facilities furnished at a stockyard in connection with the receiving, buying, or selling on a commission basis or otherwise, marketing, feeding, watering, holding, delivery, shipment, weighing, or handling in commerce, of livestock.

4. Section 301(d) of the Act defines the term "dealer" to mean

any person, not a market agency, engaged in the business of buying or selling in commerce livestock at a stockyard, either on his own account or as the employee or agent of the vendor or purchaser.

(Emphasis supplied.)

5. The regulations also stated that the "area from which livestock would normally come to the public market at this Stockyard" is the State of Colorado, except approximately the eastern one-sixth of it.

The amended regulations are similar to preceding ones, effective June 1, 1938, which, among other things, said:

No person, without the express permission of this Company in writing, shall solicit any business in these yards for other markets, sales at outside feed yards or country points, or endeavor to secure customers to sell or purchase livestock elsewhere.

Regulations of the Denver Union Stockyards Company (effective June 1, 1938), p. 4, § 11, Rules 10 and 11, on file in the Livestock Division, Agricultural Marketing Service, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.

6. Section 312 of the Act is also relevant. It provides:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any stockyard owner, market agency, or dealer to engage in or use any unfair unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practice or device in connection with the receiving, marketing, buying, or selling on a commission basis or otherwise, feeding, watering, holding, delivery, shipment, weighing, or handling, in commerce at a stockyard, of livestock.

(b) Whenever complaint is made to the Secretary by any person, or whenever the Secretary has reason to believe, that any stockyard owner, market agency, or dealer is violating the provisions of subsection (a), the Secretary, after notice and full hearing, may make an order that he shall cease and desist from continuing such violation to the extent that the Secretary finds that it does or will exist.

(Emphasis supplied.)

7. Authority to review and determine such proceedings had been delegated by the Secretary of Agriculture to the Judicial Officer (10 Fed.Reg. 13769; 11 Fed.Reg. 177A-233; 18 Fed.Reg. 3219, 3648; 19 Fed.Reg. 11) pursuant to the Act of April 4, 1940, 54 Stat. 81, 5 U.S.C. § 516a.

8. The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the proceeding under 5 U.S.C. § 1032.

9. As shown in the statement, respondent alleged that the regulation did not "relate to the furnishing of stockyard services, and is therefore unauthorized and invalid," and, alternatively, that the regulation "is unjust, unreasonable and discriminatory and should be set aside as unlawful."