|
Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, Vol. 4
Contents:
Presidential Election: Senate, 1826
Mr. VAN BUREN. Under the Articles of Confederation, the representation of each state in the general government was equal. The Union was in all respects purely federal, a league of sovereign states upon equal terms. To remedy certain defects, by supplying certain powers, the Convention which framed the present Constitution was called. That Convention, it is now well known, was immediately divided into parties, on the interesting question of the extent of power to be given to the new [p.489] government—whether it should be federal or national; whether dependent upon or independent of the state governments. It is equally well known that that point, after having several times arrested the proceedings of the Convention, and threatened a dissolution of the Confederation, subsequently divided the people of the states on the question of ratification. He might add that, with the superadded question of what powers have been given by the Constitution to the federal government, to the agitation of which the feelings which sprang out in the Convention greatly contributed, it and continued to divide the people of this country down to the present period. The party in the Convention in favor of a more energetic government, being unable to carry, or, if able, unwilling to hazard the success of the. plan with the states, a middle course was agreed upon. That was, that the government should be neither federal nor national, but a mixture of both; that of the legislative department, one branch—the power of representation—should be wholly national, and the other—the Senate—wholly federal; that, in the choice of the executive, both interests should be regarded, and that the judicial should be organized by the other two. But, to quiet effectually the apprehensions of the advocates for the rights and interest of the states, it was provided that the general government should be made entirely dependent, for its continuance, on the will and pleasure of the state governments. Hence it was decided that the House of Representatives should be apportioned among the states, with reference to their population, and chosen by the people; and power was given to Congress to regulate and secure their choice, independent of and beyond the control of the state governments. That the Senate should be chosen exclusively by the state legislatures; and that the choice of the electors of President and Vice-President, although the principle of their apportionment was established by the Constitution, should, in all respects, except the time of their appointment and of their meeting, be under the exclusive control of the legislatures of the several states.
On reference to the proceedings of the state conventions, it will be seen that, in several of the states, the control by Congress over the choice of representatives merely, was strongly remonstrated against; that amendments were proposed for its qualification by the states of South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and New York; that most of them resolved that it should be a standing instruction to their delegates in Congress, to endeavor to effect that and other amendments proposed, The proposition of the gentleman from New Jersey, to which Mr. Van Buren had alluded, would, if adopted, break an important link in the chain of dependency of the general upon the state governments. It would surrender to the general government all control over the election of President and Vice-President, by placing the choice of electors on the same footing with that of representatives. It would at this time be premature to go into a minute examination of the provisions of the resolution alluded to, to show that such would be its effects. Upon examination, it will be found that such would be its construction; that it does in substance what another proposition upon their table, originating in the other house, does in words. But even were there doubt upon that subject, that doubt should be removed by an express provision, reserving to the states their present control over the election, except as to what is particularly provided for in the resolution now proposed If it is fit to take from the states their control over the choice of electors of President and Vice-President, and give it to the federal government, [p.490] it would be equally proper, under the popular idea of giving their election to the people, to divide the states into districts for the choice of senators, as was proposed in the Convention, and give to Congress the control over their election aim. If the system be once broken in upon in this respect, the other measure will naturally follow, and we shall then have what was so much dreaded by those who have gone before us, need what he feared would be so much regretted by those who come after,—a completely consolidated government, a government in which the state governments would be no otherwise known or felt than as it became necessary to control them. To all this Mr. Van Buren was opposed.
At the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, it was a question of much speculation and discussion, which of the two governments would be most in danger from the accumulation of influence by the operation of the powers distributed by the Constitution. That discussion was founded on the assumption that they were, in several respects, rival powers, and that such powers would always be found in collision. The best lights which could be thrown upon the subject were derived from the examples afforded by the fates of several of the governments of the old world, which were deemed to be, in some respects, similar to ours. But the governments in question having operated upon, and been administered by, people whose habits, characters, tempers, and conditions, were essentially different from ours, the inferences to be derived from that source were, at best, unsatisfactory. Mr. Van Buren thought that experience—the only unerring criterion by which matters of this description could be tested—had settled for us the general point of the operation of the power conferred by the Constitution upon the relative strength and influence of the respective governments. It was, in his judgment, susceptible of entire demonstration, that the Federal Constitution find worked a gradual, if not an undue, increase of the strength and control of the general government, and a correspondent reduction of the influence, and, consequently, of the respectability, of the state governments.
Contents:
Chicago: Elliot, Jonathan, ed., "Presidential Election: Senate, 1826," Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, Vol. 4 in The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1901), Original Sources, accessed December 6, 2024, http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=V5YWT8GWXM2GU6D.
MLA: . "Presidential Election: Senate, 1826." Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, Vol. 4, edited by Elliot, Jonathan, in The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787, Vol. 4, Philadelphia, J. B. Lipincott Company, 1901, Original Sources. 6 Dec. 2024. http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=V5YWT8GWXM2GU6D.
Harvard: (ed.), 'Presidential Election: Senate, 1826' in Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, Vol. 4. cited in 1901, The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787, J. B. Lipincott Company, Philadelphia. Original Sources, retrieved 6 December 2024, from http://www.originalsources.com/Document.aspx?DocID=V5YWT8GWXM2GU6D.
|